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Non-technical summary
National economic concerns still hinder the implementation of effective policy mea-
sures that would enable a significant reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Consi-
dering other economic problems like unemployment, the enforcement of Maastricht
criterions and highly tensed social security systems, the global warming issue seems
to be of less priority on the political agenda of EU governments. Nevertheless, the
international political pressure forces policy-makers to do something and show at
least political willingness. One frequently mentioned instrument that might enable
governments to escape the dilemma is the idea of an environmental tax reform. The
hope that advocats have in mind is to obtain two positive effects at the same time
(double dividend): a decrease in greenhouse gas emissions and an increase in em-
ployment and/or consumer welfare.
Our analysis shows that, from an empirical point of view, obtaining an economic
dividend in terms of welfare by undertaking an ’intelligent’ environmental tax reform
remains at least possible, but relying on it seems rather optimistic as there are nu-
merous uncertain influences that might alter the sign of the welfare effect. Obtaining
an economic dividend in terms of employment seems to be more robust. But, the ho-
pe that an environmental tax reform might contribute substantially to solve the pro-
blem of unemployment melts away.
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Abstract
While there is some hope that the ongoing climate change negotiations will soon
come up with concrete, time scheduled and binding emission reduction commit-
ments, the question of how to achieve these targets is still unsolved.
The objective of this paper is to analyse alternative settings of an environmental tax
reform and its economic and environmental impacts on the EU. The methodological
framework used is based on a multi-country and multi-sectoral computable general
equilibrium model for eleven EU-member states. The emphasis of the analysis lies
on the institutional setting of a carbon dioxide reduction policy and on the specifi-
cation of the labour market. The institutional settings analysed are related to the de-
gree of environmental policy coordination. As standard neo-classics neglegt the pro-
blem of unvoluntary unemployment, we relax this restriction in the second part of
the analysis in order to test alternative (more rigid) labour market specifications. The
major findings of the paper can be summarized as follows: 1) There is some potenti-
al for a double dividend in the EU. 2) Coordination beats not always unilateral acti-
ons. 3) Labour market rigidities play a crucial role to both, the double dividend and
the coordination issue.
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11 Introduction
While there is some hope that the ongoing climate change negotiations come up
soon with concrete, time scheduled and binding emission reduction commitments,
the question of how to achieve these targets is still unsolved. This irresolution holds
for both, the type and/or mix of instruments and the degree of international coopera-
tion with respect to joint or unilateral implementation. In the pre-Kyoto period the
European Commission claimed for all industrialized countries a 15% reduction of
greenhouse gases by 2010 based on the emissions of 1990 not knowing exactly how
such a promise could be achieved.
Even those emission projections that take into account some political action (con-
ventional wisdom scenarios) estimate an EU-wide increase of greenhouse gas emis-
sions up to 8% by 2010. Based on these growth estimates the actual reduction ac-
counts for 23% - a rather ambitious goal that will be hardly reached if efficient in-
struments are not launched within the next few years. Unfortunately many EU mem-
ber states are currently sharing the same economic problems: high unemployment,
high taxes that are hard to reduce because of the public deficit criterions given by
the Maastricht Treaty and the Monetary Union and increasing social security rates
because of increasing unemplyoment and the aging of societies.
Obviously, the implementation of environmental policy instruments should not hin-
der other economic or political goals like GDP growth, international competitive-
ness or employment. The discussion whether there exists a ’no regrets’ policy, that
improves environmental quality without negative impacts on the economy, has been
raised a long time ago but has not been solved yet. While the inital discussion has
addressed mainly the longer term which ranks around the Porter-Hypothesis, the re-
cent debate revolves more around the short term and is linked to optimal taxation.
The hope that advocates have in mind is to obtain a so called double dividend (one
for the environment and one for employment and/or economic welfare) by genera-
ting a revenue neutral tax reform that is more efficient than a given pre-existing one.
Considering both, the climate change issue and the problem of unemployment, it
seems straightforward to tax emissions or energy and reduce labour costs by recy-
cling the tax receipts to employers’ social security contribution in a revenue neutral
way. If one could prove the existence of a double dividend that is linked to such an
environmental tax reform, its acceptance could be improved considerably.
The objective of this paper is to analyse such a tax reform and its impact on the EU
economy. For this purpose we first present an analytical framework that enables the
analysis of alternative policy instruments on the national and the EU-wide level.
This part of the paper deals with the description of a computable general equilibrium
model GEM-E3 for eleven EU member states. A brief outline of the model will ex-
2plain the general scope, the assumptions made, the agents considered and their un-
derlying behaviour.
Subsequently we apply this framework to identify and assess the economic and envi-
ronmental impacts of alternative tax reforms. The emphasis of the analysis lies on
the institutional setting of a carbon dioxide reduction policy and on the behaviour of
agents in the labour market. Both aspects seem to be rather crucial for the economic
impact of environmental tax proposals. The institutional settings analysed are related
to the degree of environmental policy coordination. In the first setting Germany de-
cides to be a forerunner in combating climate change by reducing the emissions by
10% within ten years. In the second setting the EU member states decide to combat
climate change in a coordinated way. The target (10% emission reduction) is set at
the EU level and all countries try to reach this goal jointly. As the policies differ
considerably with respect to the environmental improvement obtained, comparing
the two implicitly assumes that the (German) policy maker is indifferent to the actual
environmental benefit achieved by the policy. One could think about such a beha-
viour if one finds that the policy maker reacts mainly to international political pres-
sure than to eventually occuring national environmental damages (that might be very
low). A reduction of 10% could offset the international pressure on whatever level
(national or EU-wide) this reduction will be. Hence, what the policy maker minds is
the national economic impact of the policy implemented and not the overall envi-
ronmental benefit achieved. In this respect, the comparison undertaken is more a
concern of political opportunity than of economic efficiency.
A standard criticism to the neo-classical framework of CGE-modelling is that it ne-
glects the problem of unemployment. To grasp this criticism the assumption of a
market clearing wage rate is relaxed during the course of the analysis. Imposing the
same policy (environmental tax reform) under alternative wage rules enables a com-
parison of impacts with respect to alternative labour market regimes.
A reconsideration of our findings with respect to the results of similar analyses that
can be found in the literature closes the paper.
32 The specification of the model
2.1 The state of the art
The global nature of economic activity and environmental consequences and the in-
creasing understanding of the interdependence of these human-related systems have
led to the development of a model generation that tries to address this linkage to im-
prove the knowledge about the current and future potential effects of human beha-
viour. These integrated assessment models usually incorporated the know-how of
several disciplines and vary in the presentation of complexity according to the que-
stion they intend to address.
Models with economic origin often use the computable general equilibrium (CGE)
approach. These models have been used quite extensively to study energy-economy-
environment interactions, but they cover usually only a part of the policy relevant
problems. Most effort has been done with respect to global warming, some models
being also used within the IPCC1 activity. Examples of global or multi-regional mo-
dels in this field are the Nordhaus-models DICE (Nordhaus (1994)) and RICE
(Nordhaus/Yang (1996)), the MERGE model of Manne et al. (1995), the OECD mo-
del GREEN of Burniaux et al. (1991), the model G-CUBED of McKibbin/Wilcoxen
(1992), the model of Perroni/Wigle (1994) and the EU-model WARM of Carra-
ro/Galeotti (1996). Welsch (1996) uses an aggregated CGE model for the European
Community to study the effect of joint versus unilateral carbon taxation in a two-
region framework.
Furthermore there are a couple of one-country applications like the models of Boyd
et al. (1995), Glomsrød et al. (1992) and Proost/Van Regemorter (1995) which try an
integrated assessment of alternative policy options. The acidification problem was
addressed mainly by one-country approaches like the model of Bergman et al.
(1995), Glomsrød et al. (1992), Boyd et al. (1995) and Conrad/Schröder (1991a).
There is a wide range of model developments that do not handle the environmental
consequences explicitly but deal with the topic in purely economic terms. Examples
of this group of applications are the models of Jorgenson/Wilcoxen (1993), Hazil-
la/Kopp (1990) or Stephan (1989).
2.2 Cost function and input coefficients and the price system
We characterize the technology of a cost minimizing industry by nested CES cost
functions. C(X,PK,PLEM,g)  0is the cost function at the first stage for producing out-
put X  given the input prices for the capital, PK , and the labour/energy/material ag-
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4gregate, PLEM  respectively. The price diminishing technical progress g is specified
by exponential rates of diminuition. This is the dual approach of incorporating input
using or input saving technical change. This type of technical change considers au-
tonomous (costless) energy efficiency improvements.
Profit maximization under constant returns to scale implies marginal revenues equal
to marginal costs which explains the output price PX of domestic production in
terms of a CES unit cost function:
(1) PX =  PX(PK,PLEM,g)0
From Shephard’s Lemma we derive the factor demand functions as variable (price
dependent) input coefficients:
(2) K
X
= aK , with a a
PX
PK
,gK K=



 ;0
(3) LEM
X
aLEM= , with a a
PX
PLEM
gLEM LEM=



, 0.
In principle, one could include all the input prices of the model in one CES unit cost
function. This, however, would imply the assumption, that the elasticity of substitu-
tion between all inputs is the same. Nesting of inputs into several aggregates allows
for different elasticities of substitution. Hence, the production structure presented in
Figure 1 follows conceptually the assessment of substitutability of inputs.
Figure 1: The nested production and factor price scheme
X
K
(production)
LEM
(capital) (labour, energy, material)
EL LFM
(electricity) (labour, fuels, material)
L MF
(labour) (material)(fuels)
M M1 8.......F F F1 2 3
(coal) (oil) (gas) (non-energy inputs)
5Capital input as derived from (2) is the desired capital stock, say Kdes. In the GEM-
E3 model we treat, however, capital as a quasi-fixed stock over the current year at a
level from the end of the previous year, say K
-1. We therefore use (2) to determine an
endogenous ex-post price of capital based on a rate of return which the industry has
earned ex-post. For that purpose we solve (2) for PKpost:
(4) PK PX f X
K
gpost = ⋅




−1
,
PKpost  is the endogenous shadow price of capital which clears the market for fixed
K
−1 . It will be used to calculate capital income PK Kpost ⋅ −1  in period t.2
If we determine an exogenous ex ante price of capital PKante , then (2) can be em-
ployed to determine the desired stock of capital Kdes . Let this ex ante price be the
standard user cost of capital formula antePK = PI (r + )⋅ δ 0 where PI  is the price of in-
vestment goods, r is the rate of return on risk-free government bonds (exogenously
given or determined by the closure rule) and δ  is the rate of replacement. Then the
desired capital stock is
(5) des KK = X a⋅ , with a a PX
PK
,gK K
ante
=



 0.
Net investment Inet with ’adjustment’ is given by
(6) net des -1I = m(K - K )0
Finally, the capital stock for the next period is
(7) K = I +(1- ) Kbr -1δ ,0
where I I Kbr net= + ⋅ −δ 1   (gross investment).
We next specify a CES price function for the aggregate LEM
(8) PLEM = PLEM(PEL,PLFM,g) ,0
                                          
2
 It is easy to check that our calculation of PKpost  is equivalent to calculating it from the zero profit
condition.
6where PEL  is the price of electricity ( EL ) and PLFM  an aggregation of the prices of
labour ( L ), other fuels ( F ) and material ( M ).
One level further down of the nesting the unit cost function for the LFM aggregate
has to be specified:
(9) PLFM = PLFM(PL,PF,PM,g)0
Again, we derive the LFM and EL aggregates as well as the price-dependent compo-
sition of the LFM aggregate from Shephard’s Lemma.3 This yields the input coeffi-
cients for labour, the material aggregate and the fuels aggregate.
The final level is given by a CES-composition of these aggegates. The fuels aggre-
gate consists of three fuel inputs (1,2,3: coal, gas, oil) whereas the material aggre-
gate considers seven non-energy inputs (5-11: agriculture/forestry/fishery products,
energy intensive products, equipment goods, consumer goods, transport, services
and non-market services). Sector 4 is the electricity sector specified already by
equation (8).
(10) PF = PF(PY , PY , PY ,t)1 2 3~ ~ ~ 0
(11) PM = PM( PY , ...,PY t)  ,5 11~ ~ , 0
where PYi
~
 denotes the price of domestic supply PYi  plus indirect taxes.4
Applying again Shephard’s Lemma yields the derivation of the input coefficients. If
we multiply the input coefficient of the aggregates by the coefficients of their sub-
inputs we obtain the overall input coefficients ai with respect to the domestically
produced supply:
For fuel inputs
(12) i,X i ia = FX =
F
F
( ) F
LFM
( ) LFM
LEM
( ) LEM
X
( )      i =  ,... ,⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 1 3 0
for material inputs
(13) i,X i ia = MX =
M
M
( ) M
LFM
( ) LFM
LEM
( ) LEM
X
( )      i  ,... ,n⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = 5 0
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 i.e., similar to equations (2) and (3).
4
 see also equation (16).
7for electricity
(14) EL,Xa = ELLEM ( )
LEM
X
( )⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 0
and for labour
(15) L,Xa = LX =
L
LFM
( ) LFM
LEM
( ) LEM
X
( ) ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 0
The dot in the parantheses indicates that the coefficients depend on relative prices.
The parameterization is based on calibration using country specific social accoun-
ting matrices which link input-output tables with common national accounting. This
procedure permits to calculate most parameters from observed input coefficients,
given a range of other parameters like the elasticities of substitution.
2.3 The foreign trade specification
For modeling intra-industry foreign trade between the EU member countries, the
Armington approach is widely accepted: domestically produced goods and imports
from different countries are imperfect substitutes. Thus dual to a CES production
function Yc=f(XDc,IMc), giving domestic supply Yc in country c as an aggregate of
domestic production (for domestically demanded goods) XDc and imports IMc, is a
CES unit cost function.5
(16) ( )c x c1- x c 11-PY = c PXD + (1 - c ) PIMX x X⋅ ⋅ −σ σ σ1 ,
where σx > 0 is the elasticity of substitution, cx  a distribution parameter and PYc,
PXDc, and PIMc are the corresponding prices of Yc, XDc, and IMc (price of aggrega-
ted imports is in national currency of country c). From this cost function we derive
both the share of domestic production (for domestically demanded goods) and the
share of imports in total supply:
(17) c
c
x
c
c
XD
Y
= c
PY
PXD
x
⋅




σ
(18) ( )c
c
x
c
c
IM
Y
= c
PY
PIM
x
1− ⋅




σ
.
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 Note that XDc is the production for the domestic market only.
8If the model determines total domestic supply, then we have to allocate aggregate
import demand, derived from (18), to the 11 EU member state countries and to the
rest of the world (row) who contribute to this aggregate import demand. Thus, con-
sidering a specific good, the imports of country c consist of the exports of the other
11 countries in that good. Therefore, the demands for the 11 goods are also distin-
guished by place of production. There will be French import demand of consumer
goods produced in the United Kingdom and produced in Spain. To obtain such a
trade matrix with 11 x 12 import demand functions by good and place of production
we specify a CES import unit cost or price function (12 = row):
(19) PIM = c PIMP               c =  1, ... , 11c
k=1
12
m k
1-
c k
1
1-
m
m∑ ⋅

, ,
σ σ
,
where PIMPc k,  is the price of imports coming from country k in currency of country
c. As there are import taxes and duties ( tdut ), it is ( )PIMP t PEX e ec k c k dut k c c k, , , ,= + ⋅ ⋅1  ,
where all exchanges rates are in national currency per ECU and PEXk c,  is derived
from equations (25) and (26).6 Given the price index PIMrow  and the exchange rates
erow c, , the eleven prices PIMc  can be calculated.
Again, a cost minimizing composition of the import aggregate is the objective of the
importing country. Shephard’s Lemma, applied to the cost function PIMc  in (19)
yields:
(20) IMP
IM
= c
PIM
PIMP
,      k =  1,...,11, rowc k
c
m k
c
c k
m
,
,
,
⋅




σ
where IMPc k,  is the import by country c from country k in currency of country c.7
Multiplying equation (20) by IMc , derived from equation (18), yields a trade matrix
for each of the 11 commodities.
The country specific imports IMPc k,  have to match the export demand by definition,
i.e.
(21) k c c k k
c
EXP =
IMP e
e
,
, ⋅
.
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 Since we distinguish 11 goods, we would have to write ( )PIMP t PEX e ei c k i c k dut k c c k, , , , , ,= + ⋅ ⋅1
7
 Because of k m k c = 1∑ , , the adding up condition k c k c k c cPIMP IMP = PIM IM∑ ⋅ ⋅, ,  is automatically
satisfied.
9In contrast to many other model specifications the version of the GEM-E3 model
used here differentiates export supply by place of destination: Domestic production
Xc  is supplied on the domestic market XDc , on the EU market EXc eu,  and on the rest
of the world market EXc row, . Firms maximize revenue, given the production level Xc
determined by the input-output solution:
max
, ,XD EX EX
c c c,eu c c,row c,row
row
R = PXD XD + PEX EX + PEX EX⋅ ⋅ ⋅
s.t. c c c c c,rowX = X (XD , EX , EX ) ,
where Xc(⋅) is a transformation function with a constant elasticity of transformation
(CET). We choose again the dual approach in terms of a revenue function
( )R X PXD PEX PEXeu row, , , , dual to the CET transformation function. Since the latter is
assumed to be homogeneous of degree one, the revenue function can be written as:
(22) ( )R(X,.. )= X PXD + PEX +  PEXc 1- eu c eu row c row 11-T T T T⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − −γ γ γσ σ σ σ, ,1 1
where σT < 0 is the elasticity of transformation. The supply functions are derived by
using Hotellings Lemma, i.e. by differentiating the revenue function with respect to
the product prices.
Since the sales identity PX X = R(X,...)⋅  has to hold, the product prices have to satisfy
the price equation:
(23) ( )c c c1- eu c eu row c row 11-PX =  PXD + PEX + PEXT T T Tγ γ γσ σ σ σ⋅ ⋅ ⋅− −, ,1 1
Therefore, the export supply is given by the following equations:
domestic market
(24) c c c c
c
XD = X  PX
PXD
T
⋅ ⋅



γ
σ
EU-market
(25) c eu c eu c
c,eu
EX = X PX
PEX
T
, ⋅ ⋅



γ
σ
world market
10
(26) c,row c row c
c,row
EX = X PX
PEX
T
⋅ ⋅



γ
σ
As export demand is determined by (21), equation (25) can be used to find the equi-
librium price PEXc eu,  which matches demand and supply of exports. Since the price
PXc  is the unit cost, determined in (1), (23) can be solved for PXDc . Then XDc  in
(24) can be calculated. Finally, given the import demand of the rest of the world
( IMPc row, , see (27) below), the price PEXc row,  is derived from the export supply func-
tion (26).
To determine the import demand of the rest of the world (row) we proceed as in
equations (16) to (19) by choosing the index row instead of c. Dividing (18) by (17)
yields the import demand function:
(27) row row row
row
IM = X f PX
PIM
⋅




The world market prices PXrow  and the output of the rest of the world Xrow  are exo-
genous for all eleven commodities. One of these prices serves as the numeraire. Fi-
nally, there is a price function for PIMrow  similar to (19) and import demand functi-
ons IMProw k,  analogous to (20).
This yields a trade surplus or deficit ( TS ):
(28) TS = PEX EX + PEX EX PIM IMc,eu c,eu c,row c,row c c⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ .
As the nominal exchange rates are assumed to be exogenous, the current account is
not balanced. Depending on the scenario to be simulated, the current account might
increase or decrease and even change the sign.
2.4 Consumer demand and labour supply
The behaviour of consumers is assumed to perform a two-stage budgeting pro-
cedure: an intertemporal allocation of lifetime wealth endowment between present
and future consumption of goods and leisure, and an intratemporal allocation of total
consumption of goods into durable and non-durable goods. The durables are distin-
guished by three (cars, heating systems, electrical appliances), the non-durables by
nine categories of consumption. Demand for non-durables like gasoline or electricity
is linked to the use of durables. Hence, demand for linked non-durbales and the de-
mand for services from durables has to be reconciled with investment demand for
modifying the stocks of durables towards their optimal levels. We therefore employ
a restricted expenditure function with stocks of durables as quasi-fixed goods. The
11
expenditure function is derived from the Stone-Geary utility function which under-
lies the linear expenditure system. Figure 2 shows the household’s allocation pro-
blem.
12
Figure 2: The household allocation scheme
expected income
LJ C S
(leisure) (consumption expenditure) (savings)
Z Q
(durables) (non-durables)
z z z
(cars) (electrical
  appliances)
(heating
   systems)
q q
(9 non-durable goods)
.............
linkageL
(labour supply)
1 91 2 3
At the first stage a representative household determines an allocation of his resour-
ces between present and future consumption by maximizing an intertemporal utility
function subject to an intertemporal budget constraint:8
(29) max ln ln
,C LJ t
-t
c t LJ t
t t
(  +  s ) ( (C - C )+ (LJ - LJ ))∑ 1 0 0β β
s.t. WT = (1+r ) (PC C + PLJ LJ )t -t t t t t∑ ⋅ ⋅
where WT is present value of wealth. Ct is private consumption in volume, C0 its
subsistence level, LJt is leisure (in volume) and LJ0 its subsistence level, s is the
subjective discount rate and r is the nominal interest rate. An initial commitment for
leisure could be LJ0 = 12 hrs/day multiplied by the average working days per year.
The price of leisure is PLJ t t t whss fss hdir nom= − − ⋅ − ⋅( ) ( )1 1  where thdir is the marginal di-
rect tax rate for labour income and thss and tfss are the contributions of employers and
employees to social security. Under myopic expectations and the assumption of con-
stant and equal growth rates for inflation and the nominal wage rate, the Fisher rela-
tion can be used to reduce the demand functions for consumption and leisure to the
following formulas:9
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9
 see Schmidt (1997) for a complete representation of the derivation.
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(30) C = C + s
r PC
(Y + PLJ LJ - PC C - PLJ LJ )
r
c disp0 0 0
1β  ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
(31) LJ = LJ + s
r PLJ
(Y + PLJ LJ - PC C - PLJ LJ )
r
LJ disp0 0 0
1β  ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ,
where rr  is the real long term interest rate which is assumed to be constant in the
standard version of the model.10
The last equation is implicit in LJ and has to be solved for LJ. Labour supply is gi-
ven by the remaining time resources, i.e. total time resources minus leisure demand.
In the standard neo-classical version of the model, the wage rate serves to match la-
bour demand of firms and leisure demand of households.
The savings of households can then be determined by S=Ydisp - PC ⋅ C.
Two types of consumption expenditure are distinguished: the expenditure for non-
linked non-durable goods ( e ) which is allocated on the second stage of the consu-
mer decision problem and the expenditure for the use of durables (this covers capital
costs and demand for linked non-durables associated with the use of durables).
The expenditure function for the variable non-durables with three quasi-fixed dura-
ble goods (Z1, Z2, Z3 for cars, electric appliances, and heating, respectively) is
(32) e( p , ..., p ;u;Z ,Z ,Z ) = p Q + u ( Z - Z ) p1 m 1 2 3
i=1
m
i o,i
j=1
3
j o, j
-
i=1
n
i
i
j
i
∑ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 

Π Π
γ
β
β
where we denote the prices of consumption categrories pi  by small letters to indicate
that they do not match directly to prices of products PYl~ . The variable u is the utility
level, Q0,i is the minimum required quantity of good i, Z0,j is the minimum required
quantity of a durable good j, and p Qi i⋅∑ 0,  is ’subsistence expenditure’. The expen-
diture minimizing demand for non-durable goods, given utility u and the stocks of
the three durables, can be derived by partial differentiation of the expenditure func-
tion with respect to the prices:
(33) i ,i i
i i=1
m
i iQ = Q + p e - p Q ,    i =  1,...,m0 0
β ∑ ⋅

,
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 The long term interest rate is endogenized if the constraint of a balanced current account is impo-
sed (other version of the model).
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The desired stocks of durables and the ex-post service prices of durables can be de-
rived in an analogous way as used for the restricted cost function approach. With an
exogenous ex-ante user cost of durables jZp , the desired stock follows from
∂ ⋅
∂
e(  , Z )
Z
= - p ,           i.e.j
j
Z j
~
(34) j , j j
Z i=1
m
i ,iZ = Z + p
e - p Q
j
~
0 0
γ ∑ ⋅


Purchases of new durables under partial adjustment restrictions (0< ~mj ≤1) are:
(35) jZnet j j -1, jI = m ( Z - Z )           j =  1, 2, 3.~ ~⋅
We finally obtain the total consumer expenditures PCE CE⋅  including both, non-
durables and the services from durables.
(36) PCE CE = p Q + p ( Z + I )
i=1
m
i i
j=1
3
Z -1, j Z
net
j j
⋅ ⋅ ⋅∑ ∑
We should finally say some words about the specification of the user cost of a dura-
ble, jZp . In principle, we could set pZ  equal to p PI rZ = ⋅ +( )δ , where PI  is the price
of the durable, δ is the rate of replacement and r is the interest rate. However, as so-
me non-durable goods as gasoline, electricity, and heating are linked to the stock of
durables, we used a composition of these goods into a linked part and into a dis-
posable part. The idea behind such a composition is that demand for gasoline ( QG ) is
linked to the use of the stock of automobiles (Z). Or, in algebraic terms,
Q = Z + QG G Z Gα ,
~
⋅ , where α G Z,  is yearly gasoline consumption per unit of purchase
price of the car and GQ
~
 is gasoline consumption from fast driving or bad main-
tenance of the car.11 The latter is considered to be a part of the non-linked non-
durables and is therefore not further specified. The user concept for durables implies
a cost price pZ of the services of e.g. an automobile which includes the user cost of
capital plus the cost of gasoline, i.e. Z G Z Gp = PI(r + )+ p~ ,δ α ⋅ . The introduction of a
tax on CO2 or NOx will increase the price of gasoline. Hence, the user cost of an al-
ready purchased car will increase while the demand for new cars will decline. Under
a carbon dioxide tax, for instance, the cost price of a car is
Z G Z G CO COp = PI (r + )+ ( p + t e )2 2δ α , ⋅ ⋅ , where 2COt  is the tax rate and 2COe  is the emissi-
                                          
11
 For more details see Conrad/Schröder (1991b).
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on coefficient for gasoline. If we incorporate furthermore a property tax or motor
vehicle tax rate τ, then the user cost of a car is
(37) p PI r pZ G Z G= ⋅ ⋅ + + + + ⋅( ( ) ) ,1 τ δ τ α
For guess-estimation of the parameters Q i0, , βi and γj  we make use of the properties
of a linear expenditure system, i.e. from guess-estimates of n income elasticities one
obtains the n parameters βi and from guess-estimates of n direct price elasticities one
obtains the n parameters Q i0, , given the βi’s (and similarly for the parameters of the
durables).
2.5 Demand, supply and model closure
The standard system of input-output accounting is given by
(38) i
j=1
n
i, j j iY = a X + F∑ ⋅
where Fi  is final demand with Fi = Ci +CGi +Ii +IGi +EXi . Ci  is private consump-
tion of good i, CGi and IGi  are government consumption or investment, respectively
(exogenous), Ii   is gross investment by origin and EXi  are exports.
Since our demand system determines consumption goods by categories and our sy-
stem of investment functions investment demand by destination, transition matrices
are required transforming demand into deliveries from the industries. Therefore, the
Ci’s in final demand have to be seen as the result of the transition matrix of the type
(branches x categories) multiplied by the consumption categories. Similar to the
matching of consumption categories to products, an investment matrix with fixed
technical coefficients serves to compute investment demand by origin (products)
from investment demand by destination (branches) as evaluated from investment
behaviour in (5) and (6), together with investment for replacement and decay, i.e.
δ ⋅
−
K 1 . The system (38) can be written as a system in the unknown variables Yi  if we
rewrite it as
(39) i
j=1
n
ij
j
j
j iY = a
X
Y
Y + F∑ ⋅

 ⋅
with X YJ J  determined by (17).
In value terms, demand has to be equal to supply:
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(40) ( )i i
j=1
n
j ij i i i i i i i i iPZ Y = PY X + (1+ t ) PY ( C CG ) PY I IG PEX EX⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅ + + ⋅∑ ~ ~ ~
where PZi  is the market price including indirect taxes, PYi~  is the price of domestic
supply including indirect taxes on production and ti  indicates the value added tax
rate on consumption. Xi j,  represents the intermediate demand of good i . The ac-
counting identity from the input side is:
(41) j j
i=1
n
i ij j j j -1, j j jPY Y = PY X + PL L + PK K + PIM IM⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅∑ ~
If we sum (40) over i and (41) over j and then subtract (41) from (40) we obtain the
national accounting identity saying that the private gross domestic production from
both the flow of cost approach and from the flow of product approach should be
equal, i.e.
(42) (PL L + PK K ) = PY F - PIM IM  j j j -1, jj i i j j
j
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅∑ ∑ ∑
This identity is satisfied if and only if total saving, involving income distribution
and fiscal policy relationships, equals total investment. Following Walras’ Law, this
market (n+1) is in equilibrium if an equilibrium price vector has been found for the
other n markets (supposed that the demand, supply and price functions are specified
according to the needs of an Arrow-Debreu economy). Therefore, the saving-
investment identity (I=S) and the corresponding global shadow price of capital (mo-
bility of (new) capital between sectors but not across countries is assumed) is auto-
matically given.
2.6 The environmental module in GEM-E3
The scope of the environmental issue is limited to three pollutants: nitrooxides
(NOX), sulfur dioxide (SO2) and carbon dioxide (CO2). For SO2 and NOX we specify
abatement costs which will increase the cost price of using pollution intensive in-
puts. To derive such a cost price, we start with the primal production function ap-
proach where material input M consists of material input M1 for production and of
material input, M2 required for complying with environmental regulation, i.e. M=M1
+M2. Let us assume that the environmentally related input M2 is proportional to the
flow of pollutants, which in turn depends on the input of fossil fuel F, i.e. M2 =
α⋅e⋅F, where e is an emission or waste coefficient in terms of tons of an air pollutant
per unit of the energy input. Combining the two equations yields: M = M1+α⋅e⋅F.
Using this composition we will rewrite the standard cost minimization approach gi-
ven by:
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( )C(X PK,PL,PEL PF,PM)= PK K + PL L+ PEL EL PM M + PF F
s.t. X = f(K,L,EL F M)
K L EL M F
, , min
, , ,
, , , ,
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅
                                                         
replacing M by M1 +α⋅e⋅F one obtains
( )C(X,PK,PL,PEL PF ,PM)= PK K + PL L PEL EL PM M PF F
s.t. X = f(K L,EL F, M + F)
K L F M
, min
, ,
, , ,
~
⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
⋅
1
1                                                            α
where PF= PF + PM e~ ⋅ ⋅α  is the cost price of energy. It consists of the energy price
and the additional costs due to environmental regulation when using one unit of
energy input. As the cost of regulation increases with the enforcement intensity, α
should depend on the degree of abatement. We therefore specify α as a function in
the degree of abatement a, which represents the enforcement in pollution control:
α = c(a) a⋅
The degree of abatement is defined as the ratio of abated emission over potential
emissions (0≤a≤1) and c a( )  are the costs of abatement measures per unit of emis-
sion or waste, measured in base year prices. They depend on the degree of abatement
with ′c a( ) >0 and c a’’( ) > 0. Finally, e is an emission or waste coefficient in terms of
tons of an air pollutant per unit of energy input. With this interpretation of α we ob-
tain the following cost price for energy
(43) PF= PF + PM e = PF + PM c(a) a e.~ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅α
This cost price of energy increases over-proportional by an enforcement in environ-
mental regulation. On the production side this implies an increasing share of com-
plementary material inputs. The change of the cost price of energy will also cause
the firm to alter its input choices. A stricter environmental policy will have a sub-
stitution effect which will result in a reduced demand for energy and its price com-
plements and in an increased use of its substitutes. This integration of abatement
costs in a cost-price concept will be used for modeling the impact of regulation on
household and firm behaviour; for the latter each sector will be treated separately.
The cost price approach can be extended for the case of several pollutants. Then PF~
is
(44) PF= PF + PM(c (a ) a e +c (a ) a e )SO SO SO SO NO NO NO NOx x x x~ 2 2 22 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
with abatement costs for SO2 and for NOX. If there is a tax on a pollutant, then there
is also a cost price component for the actual emissions, i.e.
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(45) PF= PF + PM c (a) a e + t ( - a) e~ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅1 .
Finally, if there is an energy tax (tF) and/or an emission tax on carbon dioxide, tCO2 ,
where no convenient end-of-pipe measures exist, then a  turns out to be zero in the
equation above.
The cost price approach can be embedded in the CES price function by replacing in
equation (10) the price of the energy components iPY~  by iPF~ . This also increases the
overall price index of energy, PF~ . Environmental regulation will then have an im-
pact on the composition of the energy aggregate F. It will also increase the price of
the product according to equation (1), and it will reduce the demand for energy de-
rived from equation (10).
2.7 Welfare measure
The welfare change used for the evaluation of policy scenarios is represented by
Hick’s measure of equivalent income variation (EV). The EV is based on the inter-
temporal utility maximization problem and has to be derived from equations (29) -
(31). In a single period t we have
(46) t t t t t t tEV = FE(PC ,PLJ ,U ) - FE (PC ,PLJ ,U )0 0 1 0 0 0 ,
where FE is the expenditure function corresponding to (29) - (31). EV gives the
change in expenditure at base case prices PC0 and PLJ0 that would be equivalent to
the policy-implied change in utility. In order to derive the expenditure function from
the utility function, we insert the demand functions (30) and (31) into the utility
function (29), and solve for the level of utility, say Ut:
(47) t
r
c
t
LJ
t
t t tU =
s
r PC PLJ
(FE - PC C - PLJ LJ )
c LJ
⋅



 ⋅



 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
β ββ β
0 0
where FEt  is total expenditure:
t disp,t t tFE = Y + PLJ LJ⋅
(47) solved for FEt gives the expenditure function used in (46) to determine EV:
t t t t t
-
c
t
-
LJ
t
-1
r
t tFE ( PC ,PLJ ,U ) = U
PC PLJ
s
r
PC C + PLJ LJ
c LJ
⋅



 ⋅



 ⋅



 + ⋅ ⋅
β ββ β
0 0
The utility level Ut  is calculated from the tth element of the sum of utilities in (29).
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If EV<0, welfare after the policy measure is lower than in the base case. The consu-
mer would be willing to pay the maximum amount EV at the fixed budget level
FE0=FE(PC0,PLJ0,U0) to avoid the decline of utility from U0 to U1. Similarly, if
EV>0, the consumer would be willing to pay the maximum amount EV to see the
change in environmental policy implemented.
The standard model version considers full competitive equilibrium in all markets,
including the labour market. At this stage it covers eleven countries (Belgium, Ger-
many, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain
and United Kingdom) and eleven products or sectors (agriculture, coal, crude oil and
refined oil products, gas, electric power, energy intensive industries, equipment
goods industries, consumer goods industries, transport, services, non-market servi-
ces).
3 Empirical analysis of the double dividend issue
3.1 Policy options and scenario definition
As an application of the GEM-E3 model we have estimated the welfare gain of al-
ternative CO2-reduction policies. Each policy is linked to a reduction target that is
achieved by a CO2 tax with a rate just high enough to achieve the given reduction
goal. The revenue from this tax is used to reduce the employers’ contribution to so-
cial security. This is the so-called "double dividend" analysis. The carbon tax should
affect the substitution of energy for other inputs and reduce global warming (first
dividend). This substitution effect could have already a positive impact on the de-
mand for labour. However, the recycling of the tax money to social security as a
partial compensation for employers’ contribution should increase the demand for
labour. The hope, the advocates of the double dividend have in mind is that the sub-
stitution effect towards more labour outweighs the output effect in terms of lower
growth. Some authors describe this positive effect on the labour market as the se-
cond dividend, others define the second dividend in terms of economic welfare. Our
analysis deals with both definitions as we are in general not convinced that the dou-
ble dividend criterion is sufficient to be 'the one and only' measure that should be
used to accept or neglect a policy. From a policy maker's view one might accept a
loss in economic welfare if the policy measure supports more employment signifi-
cantly.
In our empirical analysis we focus on the double dividend issue under two institu-
tional settings. The settings are related to the degree of environmental policy coordi-
nation. In the first setting Germany decides to be a forerunner in combating climate
change by reducing the emissions (of the base year) by 10% within ten years. The
other EU countries do not apply particular measures for reduction. In the second
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setting the EU member states decide to combat climate change in a coordinated way.
The target of 10% emission reduction is set at the EU level and all countries try to
reach this goal together. Hence, in this setting, the marginal costs are equalized not
only across sectors but across countries as well.
One could think about other schemes of coordination, e.g. every country reduces
10% of its base year emissions or a ’full’ coordination policy where the winners
compensate the losers via side payments. These schemes are not discussed here. We
rather view the climate topic from a German policy maker’s perspective. Hence, the
issue of concern is: ’What can Germany gain from an EU-wide coordinated envi-
ronmental tax reform?’.
It is evident that the overall EU-wide emission reductions of the two scenarios speci-
fied above are different. Hence, we do not analyse solely an efficiency gain due to a
better allocation from coordination.12 The policies differ considerably with respect to
the environmental improvement obtained and the economic burden on the economy.
Comparing the two policies implicitly assumes that the German policy maker is in-
different to the actual environmental benefit achieved by the policy. One could think
about such a behaviour if one finds that the policy maker reacts mainly to internatio-
nal requests given for example by the ongoing negotiations of the Climate Conven-
tion than to eventually occuring national environmental damages (that might be very
low). Advertising a reduction of 10% could offset the international pressure on
whatever level (national or EU-wide) this reduction will be. Hence, what the policy
maker minds is then the national economic impact of the policy implemented and
not the environmental benefit achieved. To this concern, the comparison undertaken
is more a question of political opportunity than of economic efficiency.
For both policy options the emission reductions are obtained by an (endogenously
computed) tax on CO2 emissions. This tax is levied on producers and consumers.
The tax reform is supposed to take place in a revenue neutral way, i.e. the receipts
are kept in the country that imposes the tax and are used to reduce the employers’
contribution to social security. The revenue neutrality is achieved by keeping the
share of public deficit on GDP constant. As the tax and the recyling is endogenous,
the problem of tax erosion induced by the decrease in emissions is implicitly solved.
Hence, the reduction of wage costs through recycling of tax receipts is limited by the
public deficit constraint.
The time horizon of target realization is set to ten years. The reduction within these
ten years is assumed to take place linearly, i.e. in each year the level of emissions (in
terms of the base year) is reduced by 1%.
                                          
12
 This was done e.g. by Conrad/Schmidt (1996a or 1996b).
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As the 10% target is expressed in terms of emissions of the base year, economic
growth will increase the actual reduction effort. To take this aspect into account, we
consider the expected emission growth in the eleven countries. The rates assumed
for this study are based on an estimate of the European Commission. It is considered
to be a ’conventional wisdom’ scenario13 and covers both economic growth and
growth in energy efficiency. The country specific emission growth rates are depicted
in the last column of table 1.
One way to consider the growth aspect in the simulations could be to calibrate ener-
gy efficiency, emission coefficients and economic growth in such a way that the
model generates (’ex-post’) the expected economic and environmental development.
This procedure turned out to be very difficult in the complex world of our multi-
country and multi-sector model.
Another way is to consider the growth aspect in the reduction plan of the policy.
Then, the targets imposed include the 10% reduction of the base year emissions plus
the expected emission growth.14 Former sensitivity analyses have shown, that it is
sufficient to limit the growth consideration to the policy targets if the structural
changes due to the expected growth are reasonable and if one looks at the results in
relative terms only. In the tables below, the policy impacts of the counterfactual
equilibrium (policy simulation) are presented as percentage change of the reference
equilibrium (reference simulation). What is shown then is the pure policy effect; as-
sumptions that are kept unchanged in both scenarios are ruled out.
Furthermore, we limit the presentation of results to the impacts that are obtained at
the end of the implementation horizon. In the tables below yearly values of the tenth
year are depicted by a ’10’ in the period line while figures that concern the entire ti-
me horizon are marked by a ’1-10’ in the period line.15
3.2 Simulation Results
3.2.1 Unilateral action versus coordination
We start with the unilateral case where Germany decides to reduce its emissions so-
lely. The last column of table 1 shows the underlying CO2 emission growth rates as-
                                          
13
 i.e. it is not very optimistic but also not very pessimistic and includes some measures that will
probably take place in the countries without imposing a ’major’ policy instrument (like an emis-
sion tax).
14
 As we had no better data, we assumed, that all sectors grow at the same rate.
15
 Further details on the periodical values can be obtained from the authors on request.
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sumed. The column eleven depicts an actual (net) emission reduction of -7%.16 To-
gether with a negative expected growth rate for Germany of -3%, the 10% goal is
reached. The increase of emissions in the other countries indicates the EU internal
carbon leakage. The emission growth in the EU is lowered (almost 2%) but the ab-
solute increase remains positive.
As table 1 shows, the unilateral 10% reduction of Germany requires an emission tax
of 8.24 ECU per tonne of CO2 at the end of the reduction plan. The welfare effect
measured in equivalent variation and expressed in percent of GDP is positive
(0.02%). As both environment and welfare are improved, the so called double divi-
dend is obtained. The welfare gain is achieved due to the increase in consumption
(0.13%) which outweighs the ’negative’ effect linked to the increase in employment
(0.26%) (more employment means less leisure as population and therefore total time
endowment is fixed). As employment and the real wage rate (0.47%) go up, there is
more (labour) income for consumption. Other incomes (i.e. non-labour income)17
decrease which reinforces the effect on employment (increase in labour supply).
Since gross domestic production falls by -0.20%, labour productivity declines. The
investment of firms falls by -0.18%. Therefore, the positive effect in GDP is linked
solely to the increase in consumption and the changes in the current account. Im-
ports decrease (-0.24%) more than exports (-0.13%) which leads to an ’improvement’
of the current account. The other countries gain or lose slighty according to the trade
relations. The interested reader is refered to the figures in table 1.
The effect on employers’ rate to social security is depicted in figure 3. Recycling the
receipts of the emission tax in a revenue neutral way leads to a reduction of this rate
by 1.67 percent points (see the bar for DE-nc). As Germany acts unilaterally there is
no reduction in the other countries.
Figure 3: Employers’ Contribution to Social Security (change in %-points)
                                          
16
 Throughout the discussion of results the sign of the numbers in the tables are kept whatever for-
mulation is used. For example we will not change the sign in the following expressions: ’the
emission growth rate is -3%’ and ’the emissions fall by -3%’.
17
 The changes in other income are not depicted in the tables.
23
-4.64
-4.55
-1.62
-0.51
-3.62
-1.53
-3.72
-5.02
-3.21
-3.79
-3.91
-6-5-4-3-2-10
BE
DE
DK
FR
GR
IR
IT
NL
PL
SP
UK
DE-nc
EU-co
-1.67
The simulation results of the coordinated policy are presented in table 2 and figure
3. The country specific reductions of employer’s social security contribution due to
the CO2-tax receipts are depicted in figure 3 (see bars of EU-co). The cuts are bet-
ween 0.51 (Greece) and 5.02 (Portugal) percent points. Most countries (Belgium,
Germany, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom) find a reduction
between 3.5 and 4.5 percent points.
Real wage rates and employment increase in all countries with the exception of Gre-
ece. Greece faces a very high actual CO2 reduction of -24.06%.
The EU-wide actual emission reduction (including the growth effect) is -13.74%
while the contribution of countries to the common target differs according to their
ability to adjust towards lower emissions (see table 2a and b). The target requires a
uniform tax rate of 22.01 ECU per tonne of CO2.
The positive effect of wage cost reduction is outweighed by the decline in produc-
tion (-0.78%). Hence, there is a decrease in employment (-0.06%) in Greece. Private
consumption rises between 0.06% (Great Britain) and 1.47% (Belgium). Exceptions
are Greece (-0.92%, due to the decrease in real income) and Italy (-0.04%, due to a
drop in other incomes that compensates the positive effect in labour income). Gross
domestic production falls in all countries as the relief of labour taxes (i.e. rate of so-
cial security) is not fully compensating the increase in domestic production costs due
to emission taxation. Again with the exception of Greece, GDP rises everywhere in
the EU. The welfare measure EV in percent of GDP is negative for Greece (-1.71%),
Great Britain (-0.38%), Germany (-0.22%), and Italy (-0.21%). For the other coun-
tries the EV shows up as a a (positive) welfare gain.
What are the conclusions that can be drawn at this stage of the analysis:
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1. Based on the parameter set used for the above two simulations, and the assumpti-
on of a perfect competitive world, we always (with the exception of Greece) find
a dividend for the labour market, i.e. employment increases. This is the case irre-
spective of the policy imposed, i.e. coordinated/non coordinated or high/low
emission reduction effort (for Germany: -7.25% in the unilateral case and -
15.47% in the coordinated case).
2. Obtaining a second dividend in terms of economic welfare is crucially linked to
the design of the policy. This is shown by the German example: while the unila-
teral ‘low’ emission tax gives a positive effect on EV, the coordinated but higher
emission tax gives an overall negative effect, i.e. the EV of Germany is negative.
Amongst others there are particularly two effects of importance: First, the increa-
sing distortion of a higher emission tax outweighs the positive effect that is lin-
ked to the decrease in labour tax and its distortionary effect. Secondly, a coordi-
nated policy leads to a drop in exports as the demand in other EU-countries is
now affected by own policy measures.
3. Within our model framework and its parameterization, the strong double divi-
dend hypothesis with respect to economic welfare has to be rejected because of
its lack of stability. The second dividend is linked not only to the tax level but to
country specific characteristics as well. In the coordinated case, Denmark and
Italy face approximately the same actual reduction effort under the unique tax
rate, while they differ in the sign of the welfare gain: The EV is positive for
Denmark whereas it is negative for Italy.
3.2.2 Labour Market Regimes
It is intuitively clear, that the imposed flexibility on the labour market plays an im-
portant role for the dividend of employment as well as for a welfare dividend.
To get an idea how sensitive impacts are due to the assumption of a perfect compe-
titive labour market, alternative labour market regimes are tested. Imposing labour
market rigidities implicitly assumes another utility function of households. For the
purpose of our sensitivity analysis we assume that unemployment is completely
compulsary, i.e. leisure due to unemployment is not utility increasing. For reasons of
simplicity leisure demand of households is kept fixed (this is equivalent to a fixed
labour supply). As an explicitly specified wage rule describes the potential deve-
lopment of the real wage rate, unemployment becomes a residual, i.e. supply of la-
bour minus demand of labour.
Two imperfect labour market regimes are examined: In one variation the real wage
rate is kept constant. Unions are supposed to have some bargaining power as the de-
crease in labour productivity linked to an environmental tax reform has no impact on
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the real wage rate. The nominal wage rate covers inflationary effects, i.e. it changes
according to the consumer price index.
In a second analysis we assume that unions are not able to keep the level of the real
wage rate but have to accept an adjustment according to the (lagged) changes in la-
bour productivity.
Table 3 shows the findings of this sensitivity analysis with respect to equivalent va-
riation (EV) as percentage of GDP, consumption and employment. Note that the EV
is an ordinal measure which can be used to evaluate policy simulations within one
model variation only. As the rigid labour market regimes implicitly assume a diffe-
rent utility evaluation, the EV can show which policy is prefered under a particular
labour market regime but it is not appropriate to assess policies under different la-
bour market regimes:18 While there is no unemployment in a classical labour market,
leisure of the unemployed is supposed to be involuntary in the rigid labour market
regimes. As in the latter more employment is matched by former unemployed, there
is no loss in utility because of a decrease in leisure. Hence, to compare the results
across model variations one has to take the two components of utility, i.e. consump-
tion and employment (respectively leisure) into account.
In the classical labour market regime, Germany would prefer the national policy.
There is a welfare gain for the households of 0.02% of GDP, whereas the coordina-
ted policy yields a welfare loss of -0.22% of GDP. If real wages are assumed to be
inflexible (fixed real wage rate) German households are indifferent to the institutio-
nal setting of the policy but they would like to see one of the two implemented: the
EV of both is equal and positive. For a wage rule with labour productivity adjust-
ment, Germany is better off to choose the national policy, but German consumers
would like to see none of the two policy options to be implemented.
To enable a comparison across model variations changes in consumption and em-
ployment have to be taken into account. We will exemplary discuss the impact of
different labour market specifications for the unilateral policy19: If real wage rates
are fixed, demand for labour is higher than in the flexible labour market as there is
no price mechanism that adjusts demand and supply (which would lead to higher
wage costs). The additional labour demand is met by the formerly unemployed. Pro-
duction costs and the fall in total output are lower. At the same time private con-
sumption rises less than in the flexible labour market case as the increase in real in-
                                          
18
 The main reason for this inconvenience is the fact that we have to compute a separate reference
run for each labour market regime. As the computations of EVs refer to different bases they are
not comparable.
19
 For reasons of clarity we suppress a more detailed presentation of the figures of these simula-
tions.
26
come is lower. Hence, households have to work more for an additional unit of con-
sumption than in the classical labour market case. However, the distortionary effect
of the pre-existing labour tax (rate of social security contributions) is higher in the
case of unemployment,20 which is another source of the positive effect in employ-
ment. In the third labour market specification the decrease in labour productivity
lowers real wage rate. The effect on employment is even a bit higher than in the case
with fixed real wage rate. But private consumption is almost unchanged as the level
of real income is not affected considerably; the employment effect is outweighed by
the decrease in the real wage rate.
How do the results of the coordinated policy differ with respect to the different as-
sumptions for the labour market? In principle the findings are similar to those for the
unilateral policy: there is more employment under a rigid labour market but real in-
come and therefore consumption increases less. The marginal rate of consumption to
employment is highest for the flexible labour market, decreases in a market with fi-
xed wage rate and is lowest for a labour market where the real wage is adjusted ac-
cording to labour productivity. Hence, in terms of households’ efficiency the rigid
labour market regimes lowers the positive effect of the policy.
If the goal of the policy is to increase employment without lowering the level of
consumption, the coordinated policy is appropriate for most countries. Under the
labour market regimes ’perfect competition’ and ’fixed real wage rate’ only Greece
and Italy are affected negatively, whereas in the third regime Germany, Greece, Italy
and United Kingdom are worse off. Under all three market regimes, there is an EU-
wide positive effect for labour without lowering the total level of consumption.
What are the conclusions of the labour market sensitivity analysis?
Labour market rigidities alter the results found in a perfect competitive world. But
again everything depends: Labour market rigidities will worsen the impact of the
policy on employment in those model applications, which find no dividend for em-
ployment in a competitive world, as less flexibility in the labour market will increase
adjustment costs. Whereas a rigid labour market improves the (positive) effect on
labour in applications that find a dividend for employment in the perfect world al-
ready. This is obvious as a positive effect on employment in a competitive world is
linked to the increase in the after tax real wage rate. A wage rule that keeps the real
wage rate fixed enables firms to demand the formerly unemployed labour force at
unchanged unit costs. Hence, production costs are lower than in the competitive
case.
                                          
20
 This is in line with the findings of Bovenberg/de Mooij (1994b) and Bovenberg/van der Ploeg
(1994)
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the appropriateness of the labour mar-
ket regimes imposed and to judge about the most realistic one. Nevertheless in un-
dertaking a medium term analysis one might expect some inflexibility in real wages.
A decrease in real wages or the assumption of a clearing labour market seems at
least in the short term less plausible. If one believes in the inflexibility of wages in
the short and medium term, a coordinated policy that taxes emissions and reduces
wage costs would be favourable for all countries with the exception of Greece. The
other labour market regimes traces more losers, i.e. there are more countries who
refuse the mitigation policy because an economic dividend is not obtained. Another
aspect is the question of compensating the losers. As the figures in the tables show,
there is an EU-wide benefit of coordination under the flexible labour market and un-
der the regime with fixed real wage rate. If one would find a compensation mecha-
nism that makes the losers better off (at least indifferent to the policy), one might
find a strategy where all countries are willing to cooperate. This aspect is a topic of
future research.
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3.3 Exploring the deviancy
Why are our empirical results not fully compatible with some other theoretical and
empirical findings of e.g. Bovenberg/de Mooij (1994a, 1994b), Pethig (1996) or
Goulder (1995b), who reject the double dividend hypothesis more or less systemati-
cally? In summary the differences are linked to the following issues:
• full general equilibrium effects versus comparative static analysis,
• agents considered,
• endogeneity of factors and number of inputs considered,
• optimality of the pre-existing tax system,
• assumed factor mobility,
• foreign trade specification and its parameterization.
Analytical studies done e.g. by Bovenberg/de Mooij (1994a, 1994b), Bovenberg/van
der Ploeg (1994) or Pethig (1996) are based on more simple static general equilibri-
um models. Their work focus on an analytical comparative static evaluation of these
models. As Pethig stresses, comparative static analysis becomes "... very messy
even in simple models..." if one releases the very restrictive assumptions on prefe-
rences and technologies that enable a full characterisation of conditions under which
a double dividend might be obtained. Applied general equilibrium analysis allows
for more complex specifications which cannot be solved analytically any more.
Hence, it is a priori not clear, why the results obtained by comparative static analysis
in simplified models should hold in a much more complex world that uses real world
data and traces full general equilibrium effects.
Another explanation is the consideration of agents. In contrast to the theoretical
analysis of Bovenberg and others, where only three agents are distinguished (house-
holds and firms are not separated), the model used here takes four agents into ac-
count (household, firms, government and foreign). Therefore firms keep a part of
capital income for investment. Hence, a policy-induced decrease in capital income
affects both, firms and households, which in turn lowers the (negative) impact on
private consumption.
Furthermore, the theoretical result in Bovenberg/de Mooij (1994a), that pollution
taxes reduce the incentive to supply labour, is not in contradiction to our model re-
sults because their proof is based on the assumption of a single input (labour) and on
a constant labour productivity. In Bovenberg/Van der Ploeg (1994) three inputs are
used (labour, energy, and capital), however the prices of capital and energy are de-
termined on global competitive markets, i.e. they are exogenous. In their factor price
frontier ( ) ,w t
p
PK
P
PF t
P
L F+
=
+


φ , a given tax on fossil fuel ( tF ) uniquely determines
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the producer wage ( )w t
P
L+
. Hence, the energy tax is fully born by the immobile
factor labour and thus amounts to an implicit labour tax. The factor price frontier in
our model, derived from the unit cost function, is (in a shorter version):
1 = + φ
PL
P
PK
P
PF t
P
PM
P
F
, ,
( )
, ,
where prices of capital and of energy are endogenous. The carbon tax is therefore
not an implicit labour tax, i.e. the effect of a lower tax on wages is not fully offset by
the carbon tax. This explains why in Bovenberg/Van der Ploeg an increase in the
energy tax harms employment as the higher energy tax is shifted onto the immobile
factor (i.e. labour) only. Hence, the higher cost of energy depresses the market wage
w
P
. In the GEM-E3 model it depresses both factor prices, i.e. labour and capital, as
the user cost of capital is endogenous. In an open economy framework the endoge-
nous PF  absorbs also some of the tax impact (depending on the ’openness’ assu-
med).
The GEM-E3 model includes a range of pre-existing taxes and transfers, e.g. direct
taxation of households and firms, employers and employees contribution to social
security, import duties, subsidies, value added tax and social benefits. In contrast to
the assumptions of e.g. Bovenberg/de Mooij, the pre-existing tax systems in the
countries considered are not optimal. Hence, one could argue that a tax reform could
enable efficiency gains which are not linked solely to a new environmental tax but to
a general change in (effective) factor tax rates.21 But this is still not in line with the
findings of Bovenberg/Goulder (1996), who show that both, the analytical and the
empirical analysis coincidence even if one considers pre-existing taxes: While they
find analytically that the prospects of a double dividend are enhanced if "... a reve-
nue neutral tax reform shifts the burden of taxation to the less efficient (undertaxed)
factor...", there is no empirical evidence obtaining such a situation: no double divi-
dend is obtained in their numerical analysis for a wide range of parameters.
Again these findings are crucially linked to the factor mobility assumptions they
make. In both, the analytical and the numerical analysis capital is fully mobile.
While in a comparative static analysis capital mobility is usually assumed to cover
the long term effects of a policy, the meaning is different if it is imposed for an in-
tertemporal (periodically computed) numerical model. There the assumption of full
capital mobility holds for both, the short (which seems to be rather unrealistic) and
the long run. It is worthwhile to stress this aspect as the mobility issue has important
impacts on the excess burden of taxes. Böhringer et al. (1996) find for their CGE-
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model for Germany a marginal excess burden (meb) of 36.5 for labour taxes and a
meb of 82.8 for capital taxes under the assumption of full capital mobility. This si-
tuation changes significantly if existing capital is assumed to be sector specific, i.e.
sectorally and internationally immobile. The meb for labour taxes is then 14.2 while
the meb for capital taxes drops to -12.5. Hence, the marginal excess burden of the
overall tax system decreases sharply if the assumption of full capital mobility is re-
moved. As Bovenberg/Goulder (1996) concede, a highly suboptimal pre-exisiting
tax system (i.e. a tax system where the meb of different taxes vary quite a lot) enha-
ces the chance of obtaining a double dividend, if the burden of the new environ-
mental tax falls mainly on the undertaxed factor (which is capital in our case) and
relieves the burden of the overtaxed factor (labour).
The putty-clay approach used in our recursively dynamic model assumes sectoral
fixed capital stocks within a single period. In such a situation the burden of the envi-
ronmental tax falls partly on capital as stocks can adjust only gradually over time by
depreciation and gross investment. This specification is in line with the empirical
evidence that can be found at least in the short and medium term and which denies
that firms can easily grab their facilities and go somewhere else if production condi-
tions become a bit worse than they were before.22
Another explanation for the mismatch of our results to those of others can be drawn
from the foreign trade specification and its parameterization. There are three inter-
related subjects of importance:
First, in countries with little or without own primary energy resources, an energy or
emission tax affects mainly imported goods. Hence, the (direct) burden due to sub-
stitution falls to those sectors that produce the taxed good, i.e. it is shifted abroad.
Second, as exports are produced with taxed energy, the demanding country (the rest
of the world in particular) contributes to the reduction of domestic wage costs. And
third, the impact of an environmental tax reform is also crucially linked to the trade
specification and trade closure that is imposed.
While most single country model applications often use closed economy and/or
small country assumptions, our model specifies open economies and relieves the
small country assumption partly. In particular, there is no constraint on the trade ba-
lance in the standard version of the model, i.e. the current account is not balanced
through an endogenous exchange rate. Furthermore, adopting the Arminton as-
sumption in the foreign trade specification is - at least in its operation - equivalent to
a specification that gives countries some monopsony power to influence the prices
on the world market.23 In a multi-country trade framework, the imports of country a
                                          
22
 see e.g. Dean (1992), Jaffe et al. (1995)
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 This is independent of the use of an (CET) export supply function.
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delivered by country b have to match the exports of country b to country a. If im-
ports and domestically produced goods are imperfect subsitutes an increase in export
prices of country a will not cut imports in country b coming from country a to zero.
Hence, a part of the burden of the environmental tax reform undertaken in the ex-
porting country a falls on the importing country b. Country b pays the tax through
the export price of a without gaining anything from revenue recycling.
This aspect seems to be crucial for the results: A higher elasticity of substitution in
the Armington function will decrease the chance of obtaining a second dividend.
Many studies imply elasticities which do not correspond to the empirical evidence.
The GREEN-model of Burniaux et al. or Böhringer et al. use elasticities of substitu-
tion around four for both levels, the domestic supply (nest of domestically produced
goods and the import aggregate)  and the import aggregate (nest of imports by ori-
gin, i.e. exporting country). Even if the literature on the empirical estimation of
foreign trade elasticities is very limited, assuming two times a substitution elasticity
around four seems rather unrealistic. Reconsidering the findings of these studies
most estimations of own price elasticities are between 0.5 and 2. Jorgen-
son/Wilcoxen e.g. have estimated import demand price elasticities for the U.S. eco-
nomy within a range of 1.5 to 2.0.24
Deriving the relation between the price elasticity of demand (eli i, ) and the elasticity
of substitution (σ ) for our model specification under ceteris paribus assumptions
gives the following expression:
el PIM IMP
PY Y
i i
i i
, = ⋅ −
⋅
⋅
 σ 1 .
It indicates that the elasticity of substitution σ  should be close to the own price ela-
sticity, as long as the import shares of domestic demand are small. A similar relati-
onship can be found for the cross price elasticities.
Of course there are other differences in model specifications that might play a role
for the results obtained. Even if the differences are of minor importance in a compa-
rative static analysis they might not be negligible in a full equilibrium analysis based
on real data. Alternative specification and differences in the underlying data are the
major reason why the findings of empirical work are less unique than those of the
analytical work. While the models of Goulder (1995a) and Bovenberg/Goulder
(1996) trace no double dividend for the US economy, the models of Jorgen-
son/Wilcoxen (1994) and Ballard/Medema (1993) confirm the double dividend hy-
pothesis for the same economy.
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 see also Stern et al. (1976), Reinert et al. (1992).
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Finally, one should reconsider that the analysis traces economic benefits or losses
only. The welfare measure chosen abstracts from any (individual) environmental
benefit. As the simulation results indicate, a tax on CO2 reduces also emissions of
other (energy related) pollutants like SO2 or NOx. The sum of benefits from slowing
environmental degradation might outweigh occuring costs easily. Integrating eco-
nomic costs and environmental benefits within one assessment framework is also a
topic of our future research.
4 Conclusion
National economic concerns still hinder the implementation of effective policy mea-
sures that would enable a significant reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Consi-
dering other economic problems like unemployment, the enforcement of Maastricht
criterions and highly tensed social security systems, the global warming problem
seems to be of less priority for national policy makers. Nevertheless, the internatio-
nal political pressure forces governments to do something and show at least political
will. To escape the dilemma countries choose their strategy with respect to least cost
criteria; the potential environmental benefit is of less importance as long as the re-
ductions achieved relieve the political requests of the international society.
The purpose of this study was to point out clearly the assumptions underlying the
model specification and their potential impact on the empirical outcomes of the
analysis. There is a wide range of factors that play an important role for the double
dividend issue. Apart from the labour market specification this concerns in particular
the ’openness’ of the economy assumed, the number of agents considered and the
factor mobility imposed. While alternative assumptions with respect to these issues
might explain some of the divergence of results that can be found in the literature, a
major disadvantage remains: there is (at least at the current state of economic mo-
delling) no complete reliability either to reject or to confirm the existence of a dou-
ble dividend - everything is linked to the reliability of the model specification and its
parameterization.
Our simulations with a multi-country multi-sector CGE-model for the European
Union indicate that a revenue neutral environmental tax reform, where CO2 emissi-
ons are taxed and the tax receipts are used to release the employers’ contribution to
social security, might yield a double dividend. But the positive effect obtained on
the economic side is rather small (for Germany e.g. the positive welfare could be
0.02 percent of GDP) and it depends crucially on the institutional setting of the po-
licy chosen (unilateral versus EU-wide coordination) as well as on the labour market
regime imposed (flexible versus rigid labour market).
In a classical labour market specification Germany obtains a double dividend if a
unilateral policy is imposed. The coordinated policy makes Germany worse off as a
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small welfare loss is obtained. There are two reasons for explanation: First, the two
policies (unilateral: 10% CO2 reduction in Germany, coordinated: 10% CO2 reduc-
tion EU-wide) are not neutral with respect to the environmental goal obtained and
second, the burden sharing between countries in the coordinated policy is not consi-
dering the ‘polluter pays principle.’ The allocation of a country’s contribution is
obtained by the (coordinated) minimum cost solution on the EU level. Taking into
account the differences in potential25 emission growth rates (which is below average
for Germany) yields a reduction for Germany that is much higher in the coordinated
case compared to the one by unilateral action.
Nevertheless there is an overall benefit of coordination. Therefore, more sophistica-
ted coordination schemes that include side payments could enable the acceptance of
such a coordinated policy by all parties (countries).
The outcomes are different if one specifies the labour market alternatively. Assu-
ming fixed real wage rates makes Germany indifferent to the two policies; there is a
small welfare gain in both policies. If real wage rates are adjusted according to the
decrease in labour productivity - the latter is linked to every policy that reduces la-
bour cost - no double dividend is obtained. Hence, justification or rejection of the
double dividend hypothesis depends crucially on the labour market assumptions ma-
de.
From an empirical point of view, obtaining an economic dividend in terms of welfa-
re by undertaking an 'intelligent' environmental tax reform remains at least possible,
but relying on it seems rather optimistic as there are numerous uncertain influences
that might alter the sign of the welfare effect. Obtaining a second dividend in terms
of employment seems to be more robust. At any rate, even if there might be no ‘no
regrets’ policy, the economic impact of such a reform seems - from the perspective
of consumer welfare - within acceptable limits.
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 If no policy action would have been undertaken.
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Table 1: The impact of an unilateral environmental tax reform in Germany
(DE-nc) (percent changes from baseline)
a)
EV              
in % of GDP
GDP             
(%)
Production        
(%)
Priv. Consumption  
(%)
Investment        
(%)
Exports          
(%)
Imports          
(%)
Period 1-10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Belgium -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
Germany 0.02 0.09 -0.20 0.13 -0.18 -0.13 -0.24
Denmark 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
France -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02
Greece -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00
Italy -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
Netherlands -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.03
Portugal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Great Britain -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
EU-11 0.00 0.02 -0.05 0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02
b)
Employment       
(%)
After tax real     
wage rate  (%)
Non-labour income 
(%)
CO2-tax           
(ECU/ton CO2)
CO2 reduction
1)    
(in % of base)
CO2-emissions
1)     
(in % of base)
CO2-projection2) 
(%)
Period 10 10 10 10 1-10 1-10 1-10
Belgium 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.3 2.3 2.0
Germany 0.26 0.47 -0.31 8.24 -7.0 -10.0 -3.0
Denmark 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.4 17.4 17.0
France 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.3 7.3 7.0
Greece 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.1 13.1 13.0
Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.1 13.1 13.0
Italy 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.1 9.1 9.0
Netherlands 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.1 3.1 3.0
Portugal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.1 28.1 28.0
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 5.0 5.0
Great Britain 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.1 4.1 4.0
EU-11 0.05 - - - -2.0 1.7 3.7
1)
 considering underlying growth (see 2))
2)
 projection of business-as-usual: conventional wisdom and no emission reduction policy (i.e. rates include economic growth and efficiency improvements)
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Table 2: The impact of a coordinated environmental tax reform in the EU
(EU-co) (percent changes from baseline)
a)
EV              
in % of GDP
GDP             
(%)
Production        
(%)
Priv. Consumption  
(%)
Investment        
(%)
Exports           
(%)
Imports           
(%)
Period 1-10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Belgium 1.87 0.54 -0.11 1.47 0.62 -0.69 -0.24
Germany -0.22 0.13 -0.55 0.13 -0.55 -0.37 -0.80
Denmark 0.56 0.35 -0.03 0.72 0.23 -0.44 -0.42
France 0.34 0.12 -0.27 0.34 -0.11 -0.33 -0.38
Greece -1.71 -0.28 -0.78 -0.92 -1.32 0.21 -2.05
Ireland 1.47 0.09 -0.20 1.07 -0.08 -0.57 -0.13
Italy -0.21 0.09 -0.30 -0.04 -0.38 -0.29 -1.01
Netherlands 0.32 0.47 -0.09 0.51 -0.01 -0.29 -0.58
Portugal 0.24 0.52 -0.29 0.67 0.05 -0.65 -0.76
Spain 0.57 0.31 -0.25 0.81 0.21 -0.41 -0.09
Great Britain -0.38 0.30 -0.44 0.06 -0.36 0.01 -0.81
EU-11 0.01 0.19 -0.37 0.23 -0.31 -0.22 -0.59
b)
Employment       
(%)
After tax real     
wage rate  (%)
Non-labour income 
(%)
CO2-tax           
(ECU/ton CO2)
CO2 reduction
1)    
(in % of base)
CO2-emissions
1)     
(in % of base)
CO2-projection2) 
(%)
Period 10 10 10 10 1-10 1-10 1-10
Belgium 1.03 3.08 -0.12 22.01 -17.5 -15.5 2.0
Germany 0.58 0.85 -0.83 22.01 -15.0 -18.0 -3.0
Denmark 0.65 1.48 -0.28 22.01 -13.4 3.6 17.0
France 0.30 0.68 -0.32 22.01 -14.3 -7.3 7.0
Greece -0.06 -1.18 -0.73 22.01 -24.1 -11.1 13.0
Ireland 0.39 1.60 0.05 22.01 -12.2 0.8 13.0
Italy 0.26 0.20 -0.58 22.01 -12.0 -3.0 9.0
Netherlands 0.97 2.02 -0.71 22.01 -14.9 -11.9 3.0
Portugal 1.17 1.97 -0.63 22.01 -13.7 14.3 28.0
Spain 0.94 1.51 -0.26 22.01 -15.3 -10.3 5.0
Great Britain 0.63 0.48 -1.20 22.01 -10.3 -6.3 4.0
EU-11 0.54 - - - -13.7 -10.0 3.7
1)
 considering underlying growth (see 2))
2)
 projection of business-as-usual: conventional wisdom and no emission reduction policy (i.e. rates include economic growth and efficiency improvements)
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Table 3: The impact of alternative labour market regimes
(percent changes from baselines)
Labour market 
regime Classical labour market Real wage rate fix
 Real wage rate according to labour 
productivity
Institutional 
setting Germany alone EU (coor) Germany alone EU (coor) Germany alone EU (coor)
Variable
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Belgium -0.01 -0.01 0.00 1.87 1.47 1.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.31 1.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.20 1.78
Germany 0.02 0.13 0.26 -0.22 0.13 0.58 0.08 0.04 0.51 0.08 0.05 1.11 -0.02 0.01 0.54 -0.12 -0.02 1.17
Denmark 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.56 0.72 0.65 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.53 0.34 1.44 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.38 0.28 1.50
France -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.34 0.34 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.10 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.65
Greece -0.01 0.00 0.00 -1.71 -0.92 -0.06 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.17 -0.11 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.32 -0.15 0.24
Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.47 1.07 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.26 0.14 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06 1.00
Italy -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.21 -0.04 0.26 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.39 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.13 -0.08 0.40
Netherlands -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.32 0.51 0.97 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.30 0.13 1.75 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.05 1.76
Portugal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.67 1.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.39 2.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.29 2.24
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.81 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.21 1.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.07 1.72
Great Britain -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.38 0.06 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.14 -0.05 0.99
EU-11 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.23 0.54 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.97 -0.01 0.00 0.11 -0.05 0.00 1.00
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